The people of Iraq went to the polls last week, and we are just now beginning to get a picture of whom they elected. The election tells us many things, not just about Iraq, or even the Middle East, but about democracies in general, and whether governing with the consent of the governed is a concept that can take hold in China (hint: it can).
For decades, the Chinese Communist Party has insisted that "Western-style democracy" could not take root in its country. China was just too different, too special, and essentially too unique for such a thing to work. Never mind that the group of islands just across the Taiwan Strait - islands that CCP members insist are as Chinese as they are - have managed to build and maintain a functioning democracy for fourteen years, with not one, but two transitions of power from one party to another. Never mind that Hong Kong actually had a democratically elected City Council in place when it passed into CCP control, and that it was the CCP, not the people of the city, who limited and restricted democracy there. Never mind that with every day these contradictions continued, the notion that "mainland China" was no different from Hong Kong or Taiwan sounded stranger and stranger, compromising the CCP's own nationalist agenda. All that mattered was that mainland China was unsuitable for "Western" politics.
Of course, even the CCP noticed that the above seemed a little weird, so they changed the subject by focusing on other places outside of Western Europe where the people were not allowed to choose their own leaders and holding them up as paragons: the mullahcracy of Iran, the military junta in Burma, the al-Qaeda friendly regime in Sudan, the Ba'athists in Syria, at times even the Taliban itself, and - of course - Saddam Hussein. Every tyranny was another example of the folly of "Western-style democracy" outside of the West.
This is where Iraq's second election comes in.
For years, Iraq's painful experiment with popularly elected government seemed to confirm the CCP's self-serving notions. As prized as the ballot was to Iraqi voters, the politicians seemed to use that power largely to aggrandize themselves, enrich their connected friends, settle old ethnic and religious scores, and generally tear the country apart. Adding to the CCP's macabre glee was the fact that their client regime in Iran was well-positioned to pick up the pieces.
Then something happened, starting about three years ago: Iraq's political process began responding to the people's needs and wants - exactly what critics from the CCP on down insisted it could not do.
It started with the formation of a functioning political opposition (al-Iraqiya, or the Iraqi National Movement) under ex-Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. The rise of Allawi as de facto opposition leader created a dynamic where voters knew they could hold their government accountable without resorting to violence or terror. Within two years, the government was not only responding with better services, but Prime Minister Nouri Maliki himself split off from the religious coalition that helped install him and created his own secular cross-faith coalition.
This month, Maliki and Allawi are far and away the leading vote-getters in Iraq. Which one will lead the country is still unknown, but clearly the Iraqi government has become and will continue to be more accountable and responsive to the people.
What caused it? The rise of an opposition.
That's what the CCP fears; that's what makes "Western-style democracy" a real threat to them; the presence of a competitor for votes that can't be arrested, beaten, or pumped full of pharmaceuticals. In the long-run, it means the end of CCP rule. Even in the short-run, it would force the Communists to attempt honest and responsible government - an anathema to a regime where the Party Card is a coveted licence to steal.
So Iraq is a reminder of how important democracy is, and how dangerous it can be for tyrants. However, we cannot simply declare victory and rest on our laurels. The CCP knows how dangerous democracy can be, which is why they have spent so much time trying to restrict it at home and limit its influence abroad. Tyrants around the world can count on the CCP to help them because the CCP understands that each tyranny that survives give them more time to rule over the Chinese people.
Thus, every democracy is a threat to the CCP, and in response, the CCP has made itself a threat to every democracy, from the oldest (the U.S. and U.K.) to the youngest (Iraq, among others).
Showing posts with label democracy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label democracy. Show all posts
Thursday, March 18, 2010
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Iran: What the unfinished revolution means
Today was probably the closest the Iranian uprising has come to reminding the world of the Tiananmen massacre. In fact, the regime-ordered violence in Baharestan Square brought back memories of twenty years ago to many.
For a large number of Iran-watchers, the last few weeks have been somewhat bewildering. No tyranny on earth has been so careful to project a democratic image than the Islamic theocracy of Iran. By allowing discussion and argument within an infinitesimal political space, the Iranian mullahs managed to look far more favorable to the rest of the world than their Arab neighbor tyrants. This was especially the case during the presidency of "reformer" Mohammed Khatami, who managed to put the free world at ease about his fellow mullahs even as the regime continued to develop nuclear weapons, funnel aid, money, and weapons to foreign terrorist groups, and cement an alliance with the largest dictatorship on earth (measured by people imprisoned): the Chinese Communist Party.
Four years ago, the Iranian regime began its departure from the charm offensive with the "election" of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. I pondered what the rise of Mahmoud the Mouthpiece meant, and I came to the conclusion that the regime was close enough to the CCP that it didn't feel the need to pretend at being democratic. It was full speed ahead to nuclear weapons, terrorism abroad, and tyranny at home. Iran had just become a large Taishi.
Now, we are once again seeing the effects of Tehran's ties to the CCP, but this time, the Iranian people refuse to play along. If anything, the events in Iran have unfolded as they have because the mullahcracy has become too close to the CCP.
The Communists had their own experiments with "elections" at a local level for roughly a decade before basically closing it down in 2006. Like the mullahs, the cadres hoped to score points with the outside world and perhaps soothe some very ruffled feathers at home. However, like Tehran, Beijing insisted on its rules, including approval of candidates and real power staying outside the elected bodies and in the hands of the local Party leaders.
However, events in small towns like Taishi made it clear to the cadres that even controlled elections can wreak havoc on their plans. Thus, they had to go. That Beijing went back to the straight dictatorial path just as Iran was relying more heavily on its CCP allies may be coincidental to the embarrassment of last month's "vote," but I'm not so sure.
After all, the Iranian mullahs couldn't help but notice the division caused by the local elections, and the factionalism within the CCP (the mullahcracy has similar factional issues). Moreover, the stubborn refusal of Hong Kong's democrats to go away had to be a shock to the mullahs in Tehran, and perhaps made them think twice about letting anyone even remotely linked to "reform" achieve the powerless but highly public role of president.
After all, something had to occur that made the regime - a group so willing to hand Khatami the reins - balk at giving Mir Hossein Mousavi the post. After all, Mousavi - the 1980s prime minister who railed against the west and cheered Hezbollah - was no less nationalist than the Mouthpiece. He never stated an intention to change the regime - even minimally. He called for greater freedoms for the Iranian people, but only within the framework of the "Islamic Republic."
To most of the rest of the world, Mousavi is hardly different from the Mouthpiece (and many believed just that), but anyone who observed Hong Kong politics would (or, in my case, should, as I did not) know better. Hong Kong's democrats are as nationalistic as the Communists; they have never expressed any interest in challenging the CCP's control across China; all they have asked for is greater freedom in their city. Yet even with these limited aims (and in no small part because of them), they still give the CCP fits, and dissidents hope.
Could it be that the Iranian regime looked out at Mousavi and saw a home-grown Kam Nai-wai? Did they see his wife as a Persian Emily Lau? Did they fear the "reform" movement - previously known for its fealty to the regime on the big issues - would someday become the Hong Kong democratic movement writ large?
Whatever their motivation, the Iranian regime lost its subtle advantages just as it drew closer to Beijing's embrace. Much like Czechoslovakia's Communist movement lost popularity, independence, and legitimacy as it moved closer to Moscow after World War II, the Iranian mullahcracy lost its deft ability to appear at least somewhat democratic just as it moved closer to a regime that came to see any democratic appearance as an unnecessary headache.
Thus, all the regime has left now are the same weapons the CCP has had since 1989: brutal military force and radical nationalism. The CCP has managed to hold itself together for two decades. Only time will tell if the Iranian mullahcracy can likewise thwart the will of the people it oppresses.
For a large number of Iran-watchers, the last few weeks have been somewhat bewildering. No tyranny on earth has been so careful to project a democratic image than the Islamic theocracy of Iran. By allowing discussion and argument within an infinitesimal political space, the Iranian mullahs managed to look far more favorable to the rest of the world than their Arab neighbor tyrants. This was especially the case during the presidency of "reformer" Mohammed Khatami, who managed to put the free world at ease about his fellow mullahs even as the regime continued to develop nuclear weapons, funnel aid, money, and weapons to foreign terrorist groups, and cement an alliance with the largest dictatorship on earth (measured by people imprisoned): the Chinese Communist Party.
Four years ago, the Iranian regime began its departure from the charm offensive with the "election" of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. I pondered what the rise of Mahmoud the Mouthpiece meant, and I came to the conclusion that the regime was close enough to the CCP that it didn't feel the need to pretend at being democratic. It was full speed ahead to nuclear weapons, terrorism abroad, and tyranny at home. Iran had just become a large Taishi.
Now, we are once again seeing the effects of Tehran's ties to the CCP, but this time, the Iranian people refuse to play along. If anything, the events in Iran have unfolded as they have because the mullahcracy has become too close to the CCP.
The Communists had their own experiments with "elections" at a local level for roughly a decade before basically closing it down in 2006. Like the mullahs, the cadres hoped to score points with the outside world and perhaps soothe some very ruffled feathers at home. However, like Tehran, Beijing insisted on its rules, including approval of candidates and real power staying outside the elected bodies and in the hands of the local Party leaders.
However, events in small towns like Taishi made it clear to the cadres that even controlled elections can wreak havoc on their plans. Thus, they had to go. That Beijing went back to the straight dictatorial path just as Iran was relying more heavily on its CCP allies may be coincidental to the embarrassment of last month's "vote," but I'm not so sure.
After all, the Iranian mullahs couldn't help but notice the division caused by the local elections, and the factionalism within the CCP (the mullahcracy has similar factional issues). Moreover, the stubborn refusal of Hong Kong's democrats to go away had to be a shock to the mullahs in Tehran, and perhaps made them think twice about letting anyone even remotely linked to "reform" achieve the powerless but highly public role of president.
After all, something had to occur that made the regime - a group so willing to hand Khatami the reins - balk at giving Mir Hossein Mousavi the post. After all, Mousavi - the 1980s prime minister who railed against the west and cheered Hezbollah - was no less nationalist than the Mouthpiece. He never stated an intention to change the regime - even minimally. He called for greater freedoms for the Iranian people, but only within the framework of the "Islamic Republic."
To most of the rest of the world, Mousavi is hardly different from the Mouthpiece (and many believed just that), but anyone who observed Hong Kong politics would (or, in my case, should, as I did not) know better. Hong Kong's democrats are as nationalistic as the Communists; they have never expressed any interest in challenging the CCP's control across China; all they have asked for is greater freedom in their city. Yet even with these limited aims (and in no small part because of them), they still give the CCP fits, and dissidents hope.
Could it be that the Iranian regime looked out at Mousavi and saw a home-grown Kam Nai-wai? Did they see his wife as a Persian Emily Lau? Did they fear the "reform" movement - previously known for its fealty to the regime on the big issues - would someday become the Hong Kong democratic movement writ large?
Whatever their motivation, the Iranian regime lost its subtle advantages just as it drew closer to Beijing's embrace. Much like Czechoslovakia's Communist movement lost popularity, independence, and legitimacy as it moved closer to Moscow after World War II, the Iranian mullahcracy lost its deft ability to appear at least somewhat democratic just as it moved closer to a regime that came to see any democratic appearance as an unnecessary headache.
Thus, all the regime has left now are the same weapons the CCP has had since 1989: brutal military force and radical nationalism. The CCP has managed to hold itself together for two decades. Only time will tell if the Iranian mullahcracy can likewise thwart the will of the people it oppresses.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
CCP's attempt to distract from one troubling anniversary lead it stumbling into another
As one might expect, China-watchers are slowly moving into countdown mode - as in, counting down to the twentieth anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre. Tiananmen is merely the latest in a series of anniversaries this year that will culminate with the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the Communist regime this October.
Of course, the cadres are desperate to have their friends and foes abroad talking about anything but the bloody demise of the visible pro-democracy movement. So they're returning a tried-and-true canard, local "elections." As John Pomfret notes on his Washington Post blog:
Buyun was the township that became the first to hold local elections at that level in Communist China (villages, as Pomfret also notes, had had elections prior to that, but are also "not part of China's governing structure"). It just so happens that Buyun held their election in 1999 - makng 2009 the tenth anniversary of the first township election the CCP ever allowed.
This is where the CCP runs into trouble, again. While Buyun was the first township election, it was also close to the last. Moreover, as Pomfret details:
The only trouble was that Hu was lying through his teeth (Pomfret again):
Whoops!
Of course, even without this obvious subterfuge, the "elections" were a sham. While village elections being common in some places, recent events in Taishi made it pretty clear that all the amenities that usually come with elections - real power, accountability to the voters, etc. - are non-existent in area under CCP control.
In other words, you can vote in village elections, run in village elections, and even win village elections, so long as you do the Party's bidding. Otherwise, your term in office is exchanged for a term in prison.
Thus, the Communists, in trying to make people forget how they responded to a national democratic movement with the barrel of a gun, have shifted attention to the times they responded to local democratic movements with, well, with the barrel of a gun. Clearly, the cadres still have a ways to go on PR.
More to the point, it is yet another reminder that for the Chinese Communist Party, nothing is more important than maintaining power - not good relations with its neighbors, not the export market of the United States, nothing. The sooner the leaders of the democratic world understand this, the sooner they will see through things like the "elections" charade, recognize the danger the CCP poses, and get on with the business of helping the Chinese people take their country back.
Of course, the cadres are desperate to have their friends and foes abroad talking about anything but the bloody demise of the visible pro-democracy movement. So they're returning a tried-and-true canard, local "elections." As John Pomfret notes on his Washington Post blog:
There's been talk in the last year that the party is again interested in political reform. Citing a speech last December by China's president Hu Jintao, some experts have predicted that the party is interested in "intra-party" democracy first, meaning it's willing to experiment with letting party members vote in real elections for seats on powerful party committees that control townships and elsewhere. Like Buyun, there have been a few experiments. And like Buyun, Chinese officials have been talking them up to foreign friends.
Buyun was the township that became the first to hold local elections at that level in Communist China (villages, as Pomfret also notes, had had elections prior to that, but are also "not part of China's governing structure"). It just so happens that Buyun held their election in 1999 - makng 2009 the tenth anniversary of the first township election the CCP ever allowed.
This is where the CCP runs into trouble, again. While Buyun was the first township election, it was also close to the last. Moreover, as Pomfret details:
Then, after two smaller, less ambitious township votes, township elections were
halted. There were no public attacks on the votes in the state-run press; the results were allowed to stand. There were just no repeats.What happened next, however, was curious and illustrative of how China - in some ways -- has grown wise in the ways of PR. Despite the fact that this type of experimentation was over, Chinese government officials kept talking up Buyun and other elections to foreign visitors, leaving prominent Americans with the impression that democratic reform was still very much on the table. After the Buyun election, I heard this kind of talk from Chinese officials routinely.
But the clearest example came when Premier Wen Jiabao hosted a delegation of Americans in October 2006. In a trip report by John Thornton, chairman of the board of the Brookings Institution, Wen was quoted as predicting that direct elections would move from the village level up to the townships, then counties, then even provinces.
The only trouble was that Hu was lying through his teeth (Pomfret again):
In an article that appeared on Aug. 30, 2006, in Seeking Truth, one of the most authoritative of the Party's publications, Sheng Huaren, secretary general of the Standing Committee of the NPC, stated that the direct elections of township leaders violated the constitution and that in upcoming elections such practices would be prohibited.
Whoops!
Of course, even without this obvious subterfuge, the "elections" were a sham. While village elections being common in some places, recent events in Taishi made it pretty clear that all the amenities that usually come with elections - real power, accountability to the voters, etc. - are non-existent in area under CCP control.
In other words, you can vote in village elections, run in village elections, and even win village elections, so long as you do the Party's bidding. Otherwise, your term in office is exchanged for a term in prison.
Thus, the Communists, in trying to make people forget how they responded to a national democratic movement with the barrel of a gun, have shifted attention to the times they responded to local democratic movements with, well, with the barrel of a gun. Clearly, the cadres still have a ways to go on PR.
More to the point, it is yet another reminder that for the Chinese Communist Party, nothing is more important than maintaining power - not good relations with its neighbors, not the export market of the United States, nothing. The sooner the leaders of the democratic world understand this, the sooner they will see through things like the "elections" charade, recognize the danger the CCP poses, and get on with the business of helping the Chinese people take their country back.
Thursday, May 01, 2008
News of the Day (May 1)
Pro-Communist violence in Seoul outrages South Koreans: The strong nationalism of the Korean people finally takes aim at the tyrannical power next door. One Free Korea has the most detailed accounts of the political repercussions.
More Olympic news: Mia Farrow is in Hong Kong to highlight the Communists support for the butchers in Sudan as the Olympic torch begins its journey there (Washington Post). Meanwhile, the cadres' radical nationalist campaign continues at home (BBC) and in Canada (Calgary Herald) - although the latter starting backfiring fairly quickly after some inaccurate charges against the Dalai Lama were noticed (and then deleted).
More Korean news: President Bush notes North Korea Freedom Week with a perfunctory statement (OFK) which was as half-hearted as the State Department's mention of the Stalinist regime in its terrorism report (OFK). Meanwhile, Representatives Pete Hoekstra and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen ripped the President for holding back information on the SNK-Syria links (Washington Times, h/t OFK). A Stalinist mouthpiece agrees to hand over some nuclear documents, but he must "clear it with his superiors" (Washington Times). OFK has the rest of the news from the peninsula.
Enlightened Comment of the Day: Michael Auslin, from the American Enterprise Institute, presents a very good set of policies for strengthening East Asia's democracies - and their alliances with the United States - on the Weekly Standard website.
Press freedom has not improved in Communist China, unless you're helping the cadres root out corruption, in which case you may have a little more leeway (BBC); for everyone else, it's actually getting worse.
Cadres conducting drug trials on AIDS patients - without telling them: Communists in Beijing "offered free board and lodging, plus monthly salary ranging from 500 to 1500 yuan (US$71.55 to $214.65)" to AIDS patients in Henan, but never explained why. Next thing they know, the patients are being given several drugs at once (Epoch Times).
More Olympic news: Mia Farrow is in Hong Kong to highlight the Communists support for the butchers in Sudan as the Olympic torch begins its journey there (Washington Post). Meanwhile, the cadres' radical nationalist campaign continues at home (BBC) and in Canada (Calgary Herald) - although the latter starting backfiring fairly quickly after some inaccurate charges against the Dalai Lama were noticed (and then deleted).
More Korean news: President Bush notes North Korea Freedom Week with a perfunctory statement (OFK) which was as half-hearted as the State Department's mention of the Stalinist regime in its terrorism report (OFK). Meanwhile, Representatives Pete Hoekstra and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen ripped the President for holding back information on the SNK-Syria links (Washington Times, h/t OFK). A Stalinist mouthpiece agrees to hand over some nuclear documents, but he must "clear it with his superiors" (Washington Times). OFK has the rest of the news from the peninsula.
Enlightened Comment of the Day: Michael Auslin, from the American Enterprise Institute, presents a very good set of policies for strengthening East Asia's democracies - and their alliances with the United States - on the Weekly Standard website.
Press freedom has not improved in Communist China, unless you're helping the cadres root out corruption, in which case you may have a little more leeway (BBC); for everyone else, it's actually getting worse.
Cadres conducting drug trials on AIDS patients - without telling them: Communists in Beijing "offered free board and lodging, plus monthly salary ranging from 500 to 1500 yuan (US$71.55 to $214.65)" to AIDS patients in Henan, but never explained why. Next thing they know, the patients are being given several drugs at once (Epoch Times).
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
China 'arms surge' supports terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan
by Curry Kenworthy
Insurgents fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan will be happy to know that more help is on the way--as part of its 'Cold War II' strategy against the U.S. and its allies, China's Communist government is apparently working with Iran to arm terrorists.
According to a June 15 report by Bill Gertz in the Washington Times, intelligence indicates that China is selling large quantities of small arms and weapons to Iran for use in the Iraq insurgency as well as for the Taliban in Afghanistan. Not only that, but China is even helping to deliver the weapons to ensure that they reach their destinations successfully.
Need a better gun? Parts for an IED? An anti-aircraft missile, perhaps? Not to worry, Uncle Hu's got it all covered. Best of all, that includes delivery.
The Gertz report mentioned small arms, ammunition, sniper rifles, RPGs, and components for roadside bombs, as well as previously-reported HN-5 missiles. Gertz also states that the U.S. administration has been trying to hush or downplay this intelligence to maintain the image of China's government as a partner.
Too bad America is listening to the engagement crowd. Communist China is 'engaging' U.S. forces right now through the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it has plans to 'engage' the U.S. much more directly in future conflict, as we will continue to show at the China e-Lobby.
Insurgents fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan will be happy to know that more help is on the way--as part of its 'Cold War II' strategy against the U.S. and its allies, China's Communist government is apparently working with Iran to arm terrorists.
According to a June 15 report by Bill Gertz in the Washington Times, intelligence indicates that China is selling large quantities of small arms and weapons to Iran for use in the Iraq insurgency as well as for the Taliban in Afghanistan. Not only that, but China is even helping to deliver the weapons to ensure that they reach their destinations successfully.
Need a better gun? Parts for an IED? An anti-aircraft missile, perhaps? Not to worry, Uncle Hu's got it all covered. Best of all, that includes delivery.
The Gertz report mentioned small arms, ammunition, sniper rifles, RPGs, and components for roadside bombs, as well as previously-reported HN-5 missiles. Gertz also states that the U.S. administration has been trying to hush or downplay this intelligence to maintain the image of China's government as a partner.
Too bad America is listening to the engagement crowd. Communist China is 'engaging' U.S. forces right now through the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it has plans to 'engage' the U.S. much more directly in future conflict, as we will continue to show at the China e-Lobby.
Thursday, June 14, 2007
McGuire discusses China on Nyquist radio show
China e-Lobby president D. J. McGuire talked about China developments on the Jeff Nyquist radio show earlier this month. Nyquist is a geopolitical columnist, author, and host who has raised awareness on post-Cold War threats to the free world, including strategic deception on the part of enemies of the West.
On the program, McGuire and Nyquist discussed the Communist China military threat, support for terrorists and anti-Western regimes and movements, religious persecution in China, the geopolitical significance of India, and more. This interview provides an excellent opportunity to learn about threats to freedom and hear two very knowledgeable commentators presenting their views. You can listen to a podcast of the show here.
On the program, McGuire and Nyquist discussed the Communist China military threat, support for terrorists and anti-Western regimes and movements, religious persecution in China, the geopolitical significance of India, and more. This interview provides an excellent opportunity to learn about threats to freedom and hear two very knowledgeable commentators presenting their views. You can listen to a podcast of the show here.
Thursday, June 07, 2007
Beware the cult of engagement
by Curry Kenworthy
I love Japan. Each free nation in Asia is infinitely precious, and Japan is one of several beacons of light in that region of our world.
As my bookcase testifies, I'm a big fan of Doraemon. (As well as a fan of his favorite snack, Dorayaki, which at times I've often eaten almost as enthusiastically as the cat-shaped cartoon robot himself.) I like Japanese noodle soup, and yakisoba too. (In fact, I've eaten noodle soup in Narita airport, where Wei Jingsheng recently had a surprising experience.)
Japanese influence on worldwide art, entertainment, and technology has been stunning, and its culture is fascinating. From creating trends in cell phones and electronic devices, to changing the face of characters in our cartoons and games, to igniting global crazes for inexplicable but cute fashions like Hello Kitty, to providing many of the cars we drive, and even to fielding walking, talking robotic servants, Japan has made its mark during the decades of reinventing and rebuilding after the Second World War. Its traditional philosophy and martial arts have also provided interest and influence in the world. The Japanese seem to lend a unique style to everything they do. I once saw a documentary on business in Japan showing a fast-food franchise where a customer might receive one of dozens of different styles of greeting based on the perceived type of customer.
But freedom is by far the most important characteristic of modern Japan. That island nation is not only shining a light in Asia, it also is an important military and cultural ally of the free world.
That's why it was a bit depressing to receive alerts from the Wei Jingsheng Foundation about Wei's detention by the Japanese government, preventing him from attending a Tiananmen Square commemoration event in Tokyo, where he was scheduled to deliver a speech.
Wei Jingsheng finally was released, a few days later, and is now out of customs and in Japan. (Update: and he's now on the way back home, if all goes as expected.)
I'm not sure exactly what chain of decisions led to Wei's detention. We may hear more about that, or it may remain somewhat obscured. But since it was a problem for this man to step out of Narita airport before June 4th, but not a problem to step out into the streets of Japan after the event had safely passed, it's reasonable to assume that this was the issue.
Whether China asked Japan specifically to detain Wei, or whether Japanese officials imagined that it would be the polite and cautious thing to do, and whatever reasoning was invoked in the process, I think someone has been listening to the dangerous lies of the engagement/appeasement cult theology.
This is the idea that keeps popping up everywhere, that the enemies of freedom, human rights, and so on can be placated and turned into our bosom friends if we just dialogue, give a little, listen to their demands, and treat them like decent people. Even if they are ruthless dictators, mass murderers, or wild-eyed radicals looking to blow themselves up in your presence. So, if we detain Wei for just a few days, it won't hurt Wei much, and China's government may hate us a bit less, right?
I'd say wrong, on both counts. China's leaders will still despise Japan, and the latest word is that Wei's health hasn't been so good.
Engagement sounds nice, I know. We like a positive-sounding approach. It also reflects the attractive idea of high expectations leading to positive behavioral outcomes. But we need not only high expectations, but realistic expectations, which make sense based on what we know from previous observations. Expecting a hardened criminal to become your buddy and the pillar of your community if you pat him on the back and give him a little of what he demands is a flaky dream. We all know better. And while engagement may be positive-sounding in rhetoric, its results are negative in practice.
Engagement generally only changes the people who are trying to do the engaging. Like a cult, its ideas can appeal to good, well-meaning people. They dream of easy solutions and polite, politically-correct interactions to defuse problems. They start to blame themselves (and others) for aggressions on the other side--absent any real provocation, they imagine that not giving in to unreasonable expectations is itself provocation and aggression. It can all sound so persuasive at first. The next thing you know, you find yourself doing strange things. Like providing development aid to a neighbor who builds up a dangerously capable military force and keeps hyping up popular opinion campaigns against you. Or like detaining Wei Jingsheng for a few days when he comes to give a speech.
We shouldn't pick on Japan in particular, of course. Not by any means; this cult of engagement has been all around the political circles of the world. I'm sure these pernicious beliefs were at work (as well as the government-as-god tendency that develops as our nations become increasingly socialized) when Wang Wenyi was detained in the U.S. for interrupting an event to speak out against a terrible dictator. Which do we hold more sacred, the integrity of the rituals enacted at our political events, or the notions of liberty and justice upon which a nation was founded? U.S. policy is riddled with mistakes deriving from these cult-like beliefs, from the One China policy to the free trade fiasco. Many other countries have gotten taken in by the cult, too.
So, this is not about Japan-bashing. To the contrary, this is about telling our dear friends in Japan to keep shining a light in Asia, and that means not listening to the insidious teachings of the engagement/appeasement cult. It won't help you, and it's dangerous. It leads to policies that weaken and undermine free nations while empowering those who threaten them. And there's a pattern everyone should notice by now: placating the bullies never results in attaining their respect. It only places them in control and gives them, if possible, even more disdain for those they manipulate. When you're dealing with geopolitics, such ideas can have terrible consequences. Engagement is not only a strange belief system, it's potentially suicidal.
Curry Kenworthy is an advocate for China and world freedom. His writings on China issues can be found at http://china-e-lobby.blogspot.com.
I love Japan. Each free nation in Asia is infinitely precious, and Japan is one of several beacons of light in that region of our world.
As my bookcase testifies, I'm a big fan of Doraemon. (As well as a fan of his favorite snack, Dorayaki, which at times I've often eaten almost as enthusiastically as the cat-shaped cartoon robot himself.) I like Japanese noodle soup, and yakisoba too. (In fact, I've eaten noodle soup in Narita airport, where Wei Jingsheng recently had a surprising experience.)
Japanese influence on worldwide art, entertainment, and technology has been stunning, and its culture is fascinating. From creating trends in cell phones and electronic devices, to changing the face of characters in our cartoons and games, to igniting global crazes for inexplicable but cute fashions like Hello Kitty, to providing many of the cars we drive, and even to fielding walking, talking robotic servants, Japan has made its mark during the decades of reinventing and rebuilding after the Second World War. Its traditional philosophy and martial arts have also provided interest and influence in the world. The Japanese seem to lend a unique style to everything they do. I once saw a documentary on business in Japan showing a fast-food franchise where a customer might receive one of dozens of different styles of greeting based on the perceived type of customer.
But freedom is by far the most important characteristic of modern Japan. That island nation is not only shining a light in Asia, it also is an important military and cultural ally of the free world.
That's why it was a bit depressing to receive alerts from the Wei Jingsheng Foundation about Wei's detention by the Japanese government, preventing him from attending a Tiananmen Square commemoration event in Tokyo, where he was scheduled to deliver a speech.
Wei Jingsheng finally was released, a few days later, and is now out of customs and in Japan. (Update: and he's now on the way back home, if all goes as expected.)
I'm not sure exactly what chain of decisions led to Wei's detention. We may hear more about that, or it may remain somewhat obscured. But since it was a problem for this man to step out of Narita airport before June 4th, but not a problem to step out into the streets of Japan after the event had safely passed, it's reasonable to assume that this was the issue.
Whether China asked Japan specifically to detain Wei, or whether Japanese officials imagined that it would be the polite and cautious thing to do, and whatever reasoning was invoked in the process, I think someone has been listening to the dangerous lies of the engagement/appeasement cult theology.
This is the idea that keeps popping up everywhere, that the enemies of freedom, human rights, and so on can be placated and turned into our bosom friends if we just dialogue, give a little, listen to their demands, and treat them like decent people. Even if they are ruthless dictators, mass murderers, or wild-eyed radicals looking to blow themselves up in your presence. So, if we detain Wei for just a few days, it won't hurt Wei much, and China's government may hate us a bit less, right?
I'd say wrong, on both counts. China's leaders will still despise Japan, and the latest word is that Wei's health hasn't been so good.
Engagement sounds nice, I know. We like a positive-sounding approach. It also reflects the attractive idea of high expectations leading to positive behavioral outcomes. But we need not only high expectations, but realistic expectations, which make sense based on what we know from previous observations. Expecting a hardened criminal to become your buddy and the pillar of your community if you pat him on the back and give him a little of what he demands is a flaky dream. We all know better. And while engagement may be positive-sounding in rhetoric, its results are negative in practice.
Engagement generally only changes the people who are trying to do the engaging. Like a cult, its ideas can appeal to good, well-meaning people. They dream of easy solutions and polite, politically-correct interactions to defuse problems. They start to blame themselves (and others) for aggressions on the other side--absent any real provocation, they imagine that not giving in to unreasonable expectations is itself provocation and aggression. It can all sound so persuasive at first. The next thing you know, you find yourself doing strange things. Like providing development aid to a neighbor who builds up a dangerously capable military force and keeps hyping up popular opinion campaigns against you. Or like detaining Wei Jingsheng for a few days when he comes to give a speech.
We shouldn't pick on Japan in particular, of course. Not by any means; this cult of engagement has been all around the political circles of the world. I'm sure these pernicious beliefs were at work (as well as the government-as-god tendency that develops as our nations become increasingly socialized) when Wang Wenyi was detained in the U.S. for interrupting an event to speak out against a terrible dictator. Which do we hold more sacred, the integrity of the rituals enacted at our political events, or the notions of liberty and justice upon which a nation was founded? U.S. policy is riddled with mistakes deriving from these cult-like beliefs, from the One China policy to the free trade fiasco. Many other countries have gotten taken in by the cult, too.
So, this is not about Japan-bashing. To the contrary, this is about telling our dear friends in Japan to keep shining a light in Asia, and that means not listening to the insidious teachings of the engagement/appeasement cult. It won't help you, and it's dangerous. It leads to policies that weaken and undermine free nations while empowering those who threaten them. And there's a pattern everyone should notice by now: placating the bullies never results in attaining their respect. It only places them in control and gives them, if possible, even more disdain for those they manipulate. When you're dealing with geopolitics, such ideas can have terrible consequences. Engagement is not only a strange belief system, it's potentially suicidal.
Curry Kenworthy is an advocate for China and world freedom. His writings on China issues can be found at http://china-e-lobby.blogspot.com.
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